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Abstract
In causal inference, and specifically in the Causes of Effects problem, one
is interested in how to use statistical evidence to understand causation in an
individual case, and so how to assess the so-called probability of causation
(PC). The answer relies on the potential responses, which can incorporate
information about what would have happened to the outcome as we had ob-
served a different value of the exposure. However, even given the best possible
statistical evidence for the association between exposure and outcome, we can
typically only provide bounds for the PC. Dawid et al. (2016) highlighted
some fundamental conditions, namely, exogeneity, comparability, and suffi-
ciency, required to obtain such bounds, based on experimental data. The
aim of the present paper is to provide methods to find, in specific cases, the
best subsample of the reference dataset to satisfy such requirements. To this
end, we introduce a new variable, expressing the desire to be exposed or not,
and we set the question up as a model selection problem. The best model
will be selected using the marginal probability of the responses and a suitable
prior proposal over the model space. An application in the educational field
is presented.
Keywords: Causes of effects; Probability of causation; Fundamental conditions;
Model selection; Reference population; Counterfactuals.
1 Introduction
The Causes of Effects (CoE) problem concerns the study of individual causation
and explicitly refers to something happened to a well identified individual. This
nuance of causation has received less attention than the study of the Effects of
Causes (EoC), also called the general causation problem. Actually, in EoC, the aim
is the prediction of an outcome after the realization of an alleged cause; in CoE,
instead, we want to evaluate the Probability of Causation (PC), i.e. the probability
the observed outcome would not have been realized if the alleged cause had not
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been made effective, despite the fact that the cause and the outcome were already
observed. Since we always refer causation to a specific individual, for the sake of
simplicity, we call her Ann.
A simplified CoE question is the following. “Ann had a headache and decided to
take aspirin. Her headache went away. Was that caused by the aspirin?”
In CoE, to evaluate the probability of causation, formally defined in Section 2,
the relevant questions are: How might one use experimental and/or observational
data, gathered on a reference group to which Ann belongs? How would one find the
characteristics shared with Ann by the group of individuals from which the data
came? These problems, also called the “Group to individual” (G2i) issue in forensic
science, have generated a large debate in legal circles (see Faigman et al. (2014)
[10]).
The issue was extensively studied in the statistical literature from a technical
and a philosophical point of view, reaching different and somewhat related results.
Essential references are Dawid (2000; 2016), [6], [3] and Pearl (2009; 2015) [14], [15].
Even if their approaches follow different routes, they agree about the use of counter-
factuals and potential outcomes originating from Neyman ([12]) and re-introduced in
the modern literature by Rubin (1974) ([17])1. The need for counterfactuals in CoE
is well illustrated by the question: “What would be the probability of the response
if no treatment had been provided to the individual in whom we are interested?”
Since only the treatment can be assigned to the individual, the matter concerns
a counterfactual, i.e. an event which assumes something different from what hap-
pened. Depending on the assumptions, different results emerge in the forms of a
precise probability or bounds (see Section 3). Although not as specific as one would
ideally like, such bounds can be of use. In particular, if the lower bound exceeds
one-half, then, in civil cases, we can infer causality “on the balance of probabilities”.
To evaluate the PC, we follow the approach of Dawid et al. (2016) [6], that identified
and detailed three fundamental conditions used to estimate from the data upper and
lower bounds for the probability of causation.
A related problem is the choice of the reference population. More specifically,
how to find that group, from among those obtainable from partitioning the ran-
domized experiment sample according to Ann’s characteristics, which best fulfills
the fundamental conditions. How much information to take into account and how
to select the best comparison group is a tricky issue, also because the choice of the
reference class can affect significantly the conclusions of the inference.
The main aim of the present paper is to make the fundamental conditions oper-
ative by means of empirical testing of such underlying assumptions, in a way that
comes up with the “best” comparison group. We set the question up as a Bayesian
model selection problem, where each model specifies a particular choice (more or
less detailed) for the characteristics to be included, shared by Ann and the other
individuals participating in the study. The best model will be selected considering
1Rubin’s approach has been mainly used to solve EoC-type problems: for this reason it will be
not considered in this paper.
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the marginal probabilities of the response and a satisfactory prior proposal in the
model space. To this end, we introduce a new variable that expresses, for each
individual in the study, the desire to receive the treatment or not. This variable
allows introducing the fundamental conditions in the model selection procedure.
Such a method can have various applications in sociology and education, as well as
in medicine. We present an example in the field of education, where we investigate
the relation between success in a test and whether or not a hint was received (taking
into account the student’s preference for receiving or not receiving the hint). The
structure of this paper is as follows. We first introduce the notation and we define
formally the Probability of Causation (PC). After the review of some results in the
CoE literature, see Section 3, we provide the assumptions we require, Section 4.
Then, in Section 5, we detail how to find the reference sample suitable for evaluat-
ing CoE by a model selection procedure. After presenting the application in Section
6, we draw some final conclusions.
2 Notation
We first specify the notation we need to introduce our approach.
Given data obtained from an ideal large randomized study concerning n individuals,
drawn from a population to which Ann belongs, assume that the study records the
outcome R = {0, 1} of a treatment T = {0, 1}, which is supposed large enough
that the sampling variability of the estimates is negligible. Let H be a large set
of variables H = {H1, . . . , Hk}, characteristic of both Ann and the individuals par-
ticipating in the study, where we assume that each Hj, j ∈ 1, . . . , k is discrete (or
even dichotomous). We denote by HA the value that the set of variables H has
for Ann. Since Ann not only takes the aspirin but also expresses her desire to take
it, we introduce a variable E = {0, 1} (for Ann E = 1) expressing such a desire
for each individual in the study. This variable, first proposed as an unobservable
by Dawid (2011), is here considered observable. We also introduce the potential
variables RT = {0, 1}, so that, if the triple (T,R0, R1) were observed contempora-
neously, it would be easy to solve the CoE problem by stating the probability of
causation (PC), defined as
PCA
△
= Pr(R0 = 0|H
A, T = 1, R1 = 1)
=
Pr(R0 = 0, R1 = 1|H
A, T = 1)
Pr(R1 = 1|HA, T = 1)
. (1)
Unfortunately, R0, R1 are not jointly estimable from the data, and consequently
PCA cannot be evaluated without some further assumptions.
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3 Some results from the literature
In epidemiology, PCA has often been expressed by the quantity referred to as the
excess risk ratio (see for instance [16])
ERR =
Pr(R1 = 1|H
A)− Pr(R0 = 1|H
A)
Pr(R1 = 1|HA)
(2)
and sometime evaluated in terms of the observational risk ratio,
ORR = 1− 1/
Pr(R = 1|HA, T = 1)
Pr(R = 1|HA, T = 0)
. (3)
The quantity (3), which plays an important role in the developments we consider,
can be evaluated by using the data for the treated and untreated individuals coming
from a randomized study or from observational data. The choice between these
two sources of data depends on the assumptions. We review the following three
contributions.
a) Pearl, 2000 (Theorem 9.2.14) [13], showed that, under Exogeneity (R0, R1 ⊥
⊥ T |HA, i.e. the potential outcomes (R0, R1) have the same joint distri-
bution, among both treated and untreated study subjects sharing the same
background information HA as Ann) and Monotonicity (R0 = 1 → R1 = 1,
i.e. if Ann were to recover if untreated, she would certainly recover if treated),
PCA is identified and equal to ORR, evaluated on observational data. This re-
sult is remarkable since it ends up with a precise probability. At the same time,
these assumptions are not easily defensible: Exogeneity, also called Strong Ig-
norability, is reasonable for data coming from a randomized study but it is
considered weak for observational data. Monotonicity, also called No Preven-
tion, is apparently reasonable (the treatment cannot be obtain worse results
than the placebo) but for some individuals, for example those allergic to a
medical treatment, it may not hold. In any case, this latter assumption can
not usually be verified.
b) Tian and Pearl, 2000 [18] demonstrated that, relaxing Exogeneity but retaining
Monotonicity, the evaluation of the probability of causation can be obtained
in a more refined form as
PCA =
Pr(Robs = 1|T = 1, HA)− Pr(Robs = 0|T = 1, HA)
Pr(Robs = 1|T = 1, HA)
+
+
Pr(Robs1|T = 0, HA)− Pr(Rexp = 1|T = 0, HA)
Pr(Robs = 1, T = 1|HA)
(4)
where obs and exp specify the source of the data (observational or experi-
mental). This result points out that CoE has both an experimental and an
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observational nature. Data from a randomized experiment amount for no con-
founding, i.e. the desirable Exogeneity property can be assumed quite safely.
At the same time, Ann made a choice to receive the treatment, i.e. she was
not forced to receive it. Hence, a difference between Pr(Robs = 1|T = 0, HA)
and Pr(Rexp = 1|T = 0, HA) is plausible and must be taken into account.
For instance, if Ann’s disease is at an advanced stage, she has little will to
be treated because she perceives that her survival is almost independent of
the treatment. Since expression (4) points out the double nature of CoE, its
computation requires having data from two different surveys, and this can be
problematic.
c) Dawid et al. (2016) consider the possibility of evaluating CoE by using only
data coming from a randomized experiment. The authors proceed in two
steps. First they derive bounds for the probability of causation based on
the potential outcomes and the constraints implied in their joint distribution.
Interestingly, the relevant PCA lower bound is equal to ERR (see (2)).
PCA > max{0, 1− 1/RRA}
where RRA, the risk ratio, is
RRA =
Pr(R1 = 1|H
A, T = 1)
Pr(R0 = 1|HA, T = 1)
. (5)
Specifically, a large lower bound is the minimum probability of observing the
response opposite to that actually observed if the treatment were not pro-
vided, so demonstrating that a different story would have been possible if the
treatment had not been applied.
The question is:
“Even accepting working with bounds, what cautions must be taken to esti-
mate
Pr(R1 = 1|H
A, T = 1) (6)
and
Pr(R0 = 1|H
A, T = 1) (7)
from experimental data?”
To answer the question, the authors detailed three conditions, called the fun-
damental conditions, to be assumed so as to estimate upper and lower bounds
for PCA based on the marginal probabilities of the response.
The three conditions are the following:
1. Exogeneity: Already defined in Section 3.
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2. Comparability: Ann’s potential response, RA1 , is comparable with those
of the treated subjects having the same background characteristics HA
as Ann.
3. Sufficiency: Ann’s potential response RA0 and those of the untreated sub-
jects, all having the same background characteristics HA as Ann, are
comparable.
While Exogeneity follows directly from randomization, the other two conditions
deserve careful reasoning, so the authors restrict their approach to when we can
make good arguments for the acceptability of these fundamental conditions.
4 Validating the fundamental conditions
Our proposal to evaluate the CoE consists in finding, among all the possible groups
of individuals differing from the specification of H , that one that “best fits” the con-
ditions of Comparability and Sufficiency. The problem of validating the assumptions
is turned into the search for the most suitable group of experimental data supporting
the fundamental conditions.
To take into account the experimental and observational nature of the CoE,
we consider as observed the variable E, (see Section 2), the decision to receive the
treatment. For Ann, this variable provides some indirect information about her state
of health, in the light of which it would no longer be appropriate to consider her
similar to individuals in a pure experimental study for which this information was
not available. For this reason we extend our experimental data to include the desire
of the individuals in the sample to be treated or not. We believe that it is possible
to get this information from people who have accepted a randomized treatment and
we also believe that this practice is much less troublesome than to have a double
survey of the same population, as in Tian and Pearl (2000) ([18]) (see Section 3).
In this extended scenario, Comparability means that, conditional on my knowl-
edge of the pre-treatment characteristics of Ann and the trial subjects, I regard
Ann’s potential response as comparable with those of the sub-group identified by
(T = 1, E = 1) having characteristics HA. In the same framework, the Sufficiency
condition refers to the counterfactual scenario in which Ann was not treated. In
this case we do not have information about Ann’s response nor the information con-
cerning her will to receive the treatment or not. Apparently, for T = 0, we could
imagine that Ann did not desire receive the treatment (so E = 0) but it might also
be possible that she did not have the drug available, but her wish was to receive it
(so E = 1). Our concern is to find the specification of H that makes irrelevant the
influence of E on the responses in the untreated group. If we can obtain reasonable
support for the condition R0 ⊥ E|H
A, i.e. if
Pr(R0 = 1|H
A, E = 1) = Pr(R0 = 1|H
A, E = 0), (8)
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it would be possible to estimate (7) by Pr(R = 1|HA, T = 0) using the data of the
untreated.
5 Model selection
To perform a selection from models characterized by different H , we need to com-
pute the marginal probabilities of the observed responses of Ann and the individuals
participating in the study. We assume a relevant effect of the treatment that can
be modelled using partial exchangeability among treated and untreated individuals.
Furthermore the Comparability condition establishes that we are not able to distin-
guish between Ann and the group of treated individuals who desire to receive the
treatment (identified by (T = 1, E = 1)), sharing with Ann the same characteris-
tics HA, as it concerns the uncertainty of their responses to the treatment. Since
Comparability focusses on the group with the same characteristics as Ann, we don’t
need to detail the responses of the remaining individuals in the treated group, and
we model them as exchangeable.
The Sufficiency condition requires that in the untreated group, individuals shar-
ing Ann’s characteristics (despite the fact that for some of them E = 0 and for
others E = 1) are considered exchangeable. Also here we are not interested in
distinguishing between the remaining individuals in the untreated group (those not
sharing Ann’s characteristics), so that the untreated group is modeled as partially
exchangeable. Of course according to what characteristics are included in H , dif-
ferent individuals in the randomized sample will be compared with Ann. We have
2k ways of selecting a set of characteristics from H . Let J be one of these choices,
identified as a subset of {1, . . . , K}. Each choice of J induces a partition of the
sample (treated and untreated), which defines a model Mj .
Then, by assuming partial exchangeability and by using de Finetti’s representa-
tion theorem inside every specified exchangeable group, we can evaluate the proba-
bility of observing Ann and the group of responses, induced by different subsets of
H .
In this way we turn the issue of finding the group most supporting the funda-
mental conditions into a model selection problem, solved, as usual, by computing
the marginal probability of the data conditionally on different instantiations of H .
Restricted to the treated group, we denote by A1,1 the set of individuals who
desire to take the treatment and share the same characteristics as Ann, with A¯1,1
its complement, and with rA1,1, rA¯1,1 the corresponding vector of responses, while
rA denotes Ann’s response. In the untreated group, let A0,e be the sets of individ-
uals considered, e = {0, 1}, A0 = A0,0 ∪ A0,1 and A¯0 its complement. We extend
these notations in the obvious way to the vectors of responses and to the mixing
parameters. We have:
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Pr(rA, rA1,1 , rA¯1,1, rA0,1 , rA0,0, rA¯0)|MJ) =∫
Θ
Pr(rA, rA1,1 , rA¯1,1, rA0,1 , rA0,0, rA¯0 | θA1,1 , θA¯1,1 , θA0, θA¯0 ,Mj)·
· pi(θA1,1 , θA¯1,1 , θA0 , θA¯0)dθA1,1dθA¯1,1dθA0dθA¯0 =
=
∫
Θ
Pr(rA, rA1,1, rA¯1,1 , rA0,1, rA0,0 , rA¯0 | θA1,1 , θA¯1,1 , θA0 , θA¯0 ,Mj)·
· pi(θA1,1)pi(θA¯1,1)pi(θA0)pi(θA¯0)dθA1,1dθA¯1,1dθA0dθA¯0 =∫
ΘA1,1
Pr(rA, rA1,1 | θA1,1 ,MJ)pi(θA1,1)dθA1,1 ·
∫
ΘA¯1,1
Pr(rA¯1,1 | θA¯1,1 ,MJ)pi(θA¯1,1)dθA¯1,1 ·
·
∫
ΘA0
Pr(rA0,1, rA0,0 | θA0 ,MJ)pi(θA0)dθA0 ·
∫
ΘA¯0
Pr(rA¯0 | θA¯0 ,MJ)pi(θA¯0)dθA¯0
By the de Finetti’s Representation Theorem, the conditional probabilities of the
responses are a mixture of a binomial model and a mixture distribution over the
corresponding parameters θs that are assumed independent of each other. As a
consequence the overall integral easily factorizes.
Now we provide expressions for the above integrals. All the details are in Ap-
pendix (8). We have:∫
ΘA1,1
Pr(rA, rA1,1 | θA1,1 ,MJ)pi(θA1,1)dθA1,1 =
xA1,1 + 1
nA1,1 + 2
·
1
nA1,1 + 1
(9)
where xA1,1 is the number of successes in the group A1,1 and nA1,1 = |A1,1|. The
notation is extended in the obvious way in the other groups.
∫
ΘA¯1,1
Pr(rA¯1,1 | θA¯1,1 ,MJ)pi(θA¯1,1)dθA¯1,1 =
1
nA¯1,1 + 1
(10)
∫
ΘA0
Pr(rA0,1 , rA0,0 | θA0 ,MJ)pi(θA0)dθA0 =
(
nA0,0
xA0,0
)(
nA0,1
xA0,1
)(
nA0,0 + nA0,1
xA0,0 + xA0,1
)−1
·
(11)
·
1
nA0,0 + nA0,1 + 1
(12)
∫
ΘA¯0
Pr(rA¯0 | θA¯0 ,MJ)pi(θA¯0)dθA¯0 =
1
nA¯0 + 1
(13)
Readers might recognize the conditional Irving–Fisher exact test as part of (12).
The result is not surprising since we are looking for the set ofH making E irrelevant,
8
and thus supporting the hypothesis of no-difference between the success ratio in the
two groups. An illustration of the behavior of the hypergeometric for nA0,0 = nA0,1 =
10 is given in Figure 1. High support to the model is achieved when the number of
successes xA0,0 and xA0,1 is almost the same in the two groups.
Figure 1: Hypergeometric behaviour for nA0,0 = nA0,1 = 10 and different values for
xA0,0 and xA0,1
5.1 Prior and posterior in the model space
The goal is to evaluate the posterior probability of MJ given the responses observed
for Ann and the sample. The overall marginal likelihood of Mj is the product of
(9), (10), (12) and (13)
Pr(rA, rA1,1 , rA¯1,1 , rA0,1 , rA0,0 , rA¯0)|MJ ) =
xA1,1 + 1
nA1,1 + 2
·
1
nA1,1 + 1
·
1
nA¯1,1 + 1
(14)
·
(
nA0,0
xA0,0
)(
nA0,1
xA0,1
)(
nA0,0 + nA0,1
xA0,0 + xA0,1
)−1 1
nA0,0 + nA0,1 + 1
·
1
nA¯0 + 1
Concerning the prior over the space of models, the simplest choice is to consider a
uniform distribution
Pr(MJ) =
1
2k
. (15)
Another choice is the one proposed by Chen and Chen, (2008) [2]. They give the
same prior probability (equal to 1
k+1
) for all models sharing the same number of
characteristics k. In this way, for the generic model MJ , we have
Pr(MJ) =
1
k + 1
(
k
|MJ |
)−1
· I(|MJ | ≤ k/2) (16)
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Table 1: List of student characteristics included in the experiment
Variable Description
1 Engineer Course 0=Civil, 1= Facilities
2 Gender 0=male, 1=female
3 Age 0=> 21, 1=≥ 21
4 Place of birth 0= outside Florence, 1= Florence
5 Place of residence 0= outside Florence, 1= Florence
6 Year of Diploma 0=before 2016, 1=2016
7 Place of Diploma 0= outside Florence, 1= Florence
8 High school 0= Other, 1= Technical
9 Diploma vote 0= <80, 1= ≥ 80
10 1st registration at University 0= before 2016, 1=2016
11 Statistical background 0= no, 1=yes
12 Father’s level of education 0 =≤ high school, 1=University
13 Mother’s level of education 0 =≤ high school, 1=university
14 Working student 0=no, 1=yes
where the search spans all models including at most k/2 characteristics. This last
choice favors model selection according to Occam’s razor principle: the fewer char-
acteristics employed, the more probable is the model. This rationale is reasonably
objective. Combining (15) or (16) with (14), we get the required posterior.
Computational issues
If the model size becomes huge, we may not be in a position to evaluate the nor-
malizing constant of the posterior distribution, but we can establish an MCMC to
make an inference about the variable MJ .
Essentially a Metropolis–Hastings would suffice, the acceptance ratio being given
by (14), evaluated for two different elements of MJ , taking into account the proba-
bility of proposing a new model.
6 Application
We carried out an experiment at the University of Florence, School of Engineer-
ing, Fall 2017. We asked 161 students to solve a simple probabilistic question and
we provided randomly a hint (the treatment T ). Table (1) presents the students’
background information included in the analysis (the characteristics H). Before the
test, we asked the students if they wished to be helped or not (the desire variable E).
We wish to investigate whether there is a causal relation between the hint and
the ability to solve the question, for those students who desired to receive a hint.
We had 8 of these cases. The corresponding risk ratio (obtained considering the
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Table 2: Educational causation. For the 8 students who desired the hint, got it,
and succeed, there are reported the characteristics H selected by the model that
best supported the fundamental conditions and the Risk Ratio
Student 1st University Statistical Education Work RR
registration background Father Mother
1 before 2016 no university university − 1.96
2 before 2016 − university university − 1.73
3 2016 no university university − 1.96
4 − − university university yes 2.43
5 before 2016 − university university yes 1.96
6 2016 no university university − 1.96
7 2016 − university university − 1.96
8 2016 no university university − 1.96
model best fitting the fundamental conditions) lies in the interval [1.73, 2.43] and in
one case it exceeds 2 (RR = 2.43), which is a clue for there being a causal relation.
In all the other cases, the causal relation is not strongly supported, since RR is
close but does not reach 2 (see, in Figure (2)), the left side of each sub-picture). In
the right side of each sub-picture in Figure(2) we illustrate how the model selection
procedure proposes models respecting the fundamental conditions. For the model
with the highest probability, the red dot indicates, in the x−axis, the success ratio
for treated and, in the y−axis, the ratio between the success ratio for untreated
with E = 1 and with E = 0, respectively. These are the main forces driving the
marginal probability for the responses, as shown in (14). Ideally, comparability
and sufficiency are mostly supported by the highest possible success ratio among
the treated and by a ratio between untreated with E=0 and E=1 approximately
equal 1. As is apparent, the selected model achieves a good compromise between
these requirements. The set of variables selected in the 8 cases are shown in Table
(2). Note that, overall, these models include only 5 characteristics, and all of them
include the educational status of the family. In 4 out of the 8 cases, the same model,
including family education, 1first University registration (a proxy for understanding
whether the student failed earlier in their educational career) and previous exposure
to statistical training was selected.
As a result of our experiment we also have that among the students who asked
for and received the hint, 24 did not succeed. We can suppose that some of them
claimed that it was the hint which caused their failure. In this case, the RR lies
in the interval [0.86, 1.60], an example for four students is in Figure (3). It is not
conclusive that there is a causal relation between the hint and the failure since all
the models for all the considered students provided values of RR much smaller than
2. In a civil trial this would not suggest to a judge that compensation be awarded.
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Figure 2: Educational causation. Risk Ratio and posterior probability for each
explored model (left side). Success ratio for treated vs relative success ratio for
untreated with E = 1 and E = 0 (right side). In the picture there is an example
concerning four students who succeed.
7 Conclusions
We introduced a typical Causes of Effects problem by means of an archetypical
example considering Ann and the effect of an aspirin on her headache. We have
proposed a possible solution to make operational the choice of variables to include,
so as to validate the fundamental assumptions underlying the assessment of Ann’s
probability of causation. We assume it is possible to take a randomized sample from
Ann’s population where, as usual, T is assigned following a randomized protocol and
E (this is a novelty) is a question asking the members of the sample about their
preference to be treated or not.
In the evaluation of RRA (see 5), an extreme position would be to include all the
subjects participating in the experiment so that simply belonging to the reference
population would make the individuals in the sample similar to Ann. On the other
hand, the choice could be to find the persons most similar to Ann, i.e. those match-
ing all the available characteristics. Clearly neither of these positions is safe: the
former ignores some characteristics of Ann which could be very influential on her
reaction to the headache after taking aspirin. The latter greatly reduces the number
of individuals to be employed in the estimation, so producing a very unstable infer-
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Figure 3: Forensic causation. Risk Ratio and posterior probability for each explored
model (left side). Success ratio for treated vs relative success ratio for untreated
with E = 1 and E = 0 (right side). In the picture there is an example concerning
four students who DID NOT succeed.
ence. Our approach takes a sensible middle course and provide a sensible different
causal inference for individuals experiencing the same treatment. Interestingly, this
is exactly the aim of Precision Medicine (see Mesko (2017), [11]) which looks for
different medical interventions for a group of individuals sharing some relevant (for
the reaction between treatment and outcome) characteristics.
The next step will be to extend the method to observational studies, to make
possible in a wider range of cases the evaluation of the PCA for Causes of Effects
problems.
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8 Appendix
Now we detail the computation of the integrals (9), (10), (12) and (13). We always
assume a no informative prior for all pi(·) = Beta(1, 1). We start with (9).∫
ΘA1,1
Pr(rA, rA1,1 | θA1,1 ,MJ)pi(θA1,1)dθA1,1 =
=
∫
ΘA1,1
Pr(rA|rA1,1, θA1,1 ,MJ) Pr(rA1,1 |θA1,1 ,MJ)pi(θA1,1 |MJ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
numerator of the θA1,1 updating
dθA1,1
=
∫
ΘA1,1
Pr(rA|θA1,1 ,MJ)pi(θA1,1 |rA1,1,MJ )dθA1,1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
xA1,1 + 1
nA1,1 + 2
·
·
∫
ΘA1,1
Pr(rA1,1 |θA1,1 ,MJ) Pr(θA1,1 |MJ)dθA1,1
︸ ︷︷ ︸(
nA1,1
xA1,1
)
Γ(1 + 1)
Γ(1)Γ(1)
Γ(1 + xA1,1)Γ(nA1,1 + 1− xA1,1)
Γ(nA1,1 + 1 + 1)
=
xA1,1 + 1
nA1,1 + 2
·
1
nA1,1 + 1
.
For (10) we have
∫
ΘA¯1,1
Pr(rA¯1,1 | θA¯1,1 ,MJ)pi(θA¯1,1)dθA¯1,1 =
∫
ΘA¯1,1
Pr(rA¯1,1|θA¯1,1 ,MJ) Pr(θA¯1,1 |MJ)dθA¯1,1
︸ ︷︷ ︸(
nA¯1,1
xA¯1,1
)
Γ(1 + 1)
Γ(1)Γ(1)
Γ(1 + xA¯1,1)Γ(nA¯1,1 + 1− xA¯1,1)
Γ(nA¯1,1 + 1 + 1)
=
1
nA¯1,1 + 1
We now compute (12)
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∫
ΘA0
Pr(rA0,1 , rA0,0 | θA0 ,MJ)pi(θA0 ,MJ)dθA0 =
=
∫
ΘA0
Pr(rA0,0, |θA0 , rA0,1,MJ) Pr(rA0,1 |θA0 ,MJ)pi(θA0|MJ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
numerator of the θA0 updating
dθA0
=
∫
ΘA0
Pr(rA0,0|θA0 ,MJ)pi(θA0 |rA0,1,MJ)dθA0
∫
ΘA0
Pr(rA0,1 |θA0,MJ)pi(θA0 |MJ)dθA0
=
(
nA0,0
xA0,0
)
Γ(nA0,1 + 2)
Γ(xA0,1 + 1)Γ(nA0,1 − xA0,1 + 1)
Γ(xA0,1 + 1 + xA0,0)Γ(nA0,0 + nA0,1 − xA0,1 + 1− xA0,0)
Γ(nA0,0 + nA0,1 + 2)
·
(
nA0,1
xA0,1
)
Γ(1 + 1)
Γ(1)Γ(1)
Γ(1 + xA0,1)Γ(nA0,1 + 1− xA0,1)
Γ(nA0,1 + 1 + 1)
=
(
nA0,0
xA0,0
)(
nA0,1
xA0,1
)(
nA0,0 + nA0,1
xA0,0 + xA0,1
)−1
1
nA0,0 + nA0,1 + 1.
Concerning the last term, (13), with a similar computation as for (10), it is
straightforward to see that
∫
ΘA¯0
Pr(rA¯0 | θA¯0 ,MJ)pi(θA¯0)dθA¯0 =
1
nA¯0 + 1
. (17)
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